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COUNTRY PAPER
ON MICRO-LEVEL DRIVERS

Drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism
in the light of individual dynamics in MENA and the Balkans

TUNISIA

Hatem Kahloun



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TUNISIA

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	3
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH	4
RESEARCH RESULTS	5
CONCLUSION	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY	32

Introduction

This report is produced in the context of the socioeconomic changes that took place in Tunisia after the events of 2011. The transition from the authoritarianism of a single party to a democratic regime of political pluralism was marked by a period of transition, during which more than 13 governments succeeded one another. The decentralisation process launched in 2016 has taken a new turn since 2021, following the dismissal of the Assembly of People's Representatives and the appointment of a new government by the new Head of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed, elected by universal suffrage in 2019 with 72% of the vote. A civil society dynamic was unleashed, characterised by the creation of numerous civic associations, the number of which exceeded 24,000 by 2021.[1] Many associations engage in defending human rights, women's rights, diaspora rights, the fight against violence and extremism, and the defence of democratic rights and freedom of expression. The national economic situation is currently facing issues of scarcity of resources and a reduction in foreign investment, making economic recovery difficult and accentuating the unemployment rate, which in some regions exceeds 18%. Despite the public authorities' efforts to combat extremism and social segregation, violence persists, and regional disparities are significant.

This work aims to understand violent extremism (VE) in four Tunisian regions and examine the factors contributing to VE, such as forms of social exclusion as well as social, political, economic and cultural inequalities. The report also aims to analyse the individual youth perceptions of the factors of VE considering the seven drivers identified in the project (religion, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, digital socialisation, socio-political issues [claims and grievances], and education, culture and leisure opportunities).

The data gathered via the survey provides analytical insights and a comprehensive understanding about the relationship of young people with the drivers. These results will also enable us to provide a comprehensive comparative perspective, leading to the development of a national report on micro level drivers of radicalisation in Tunisia.

[1] Kahloun, H, 2021, La société civile tunisienne à l'épreuve de la participation : mobilisation, pression et compromis autour des projets de développement urbain. *Insaniyat*, no 90, October-December 2020, pp. 99-120.



Methodological approach

The questionnaire was conducted in five representative districts of Tunisia: Greater Tunis (the capital and its region), the north (Bizerte), the centre (Sidi Bouzid), and the south (Medenine). In each region, the sample was spread over settlements of different demographic sizes, with the aim of covering a variety of geographical areas of the country. This ensured a diversity of attitudes among the young people surveyed and covered all possible situations, taking into account local economic and geographical specificities and representations of extremism in the regions. The final sample consisted of 528 respondents.

District/Region	Settlement	Sample
Greater Tunis	Fouchena	122
	M'hammedia	
	Jbal Jeloud	
	Ettadhamen	
North (Bizerte)	Bizerte Center	113
	Bizerte - Ras Jebal	
	Bizerte - El Alia	
Centre (Sidi Bouzid)	Sidi Bouzid - Center	158
	Sidi Bouzid - Mazzouna	
	Sidi Bouzid Lesouda	
	Sidi Bouzid - Jelma	
South (Medenine)	Djerba Houmet Essouk	135
	Djerba Midoun/Ajim	
	Ben Guedene	
Total		528

Data collection was carried out by a group of interviewers, who were trained in questionnaire implementation and then supervised by the principal expert in charge of the study. The questionnaire was deployed on digital tools using tablets and smartphones. The data was then transmitted to the head office, where it was stored and processed.


Research results

ANALYSING THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AT THE MICRO-LEVEL

Religion

The question on religious affiliation (what is your religion?) reveals a Muslim majority of 99.1% of the population surveyed.


Figure 1 What is you religion?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The following graph shows a high degree of religiosity. Indeed, 74% of respondents consider themselves to be true believers and accept all the teachings of the faith. Those who say they are not religious represent 16%, 6% of whom are opposed to religious dogma.

Figure 2 Which of the following statements about religion best describes you?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Religiosity by gender and age shows that men are less religious than women. Young people in the 20-30 age group are the most religious (51%)

Figure 3 Which of the following statements about religion best describes you? (according to gender)






Figure 4 Which of the following statements about religion best describes you? (according to age range)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The survey results show that 40% of those with a strong religious attachment have not attained a higher level of education (primary or secondary school).


Figure 5 Which of the following statements about religion best describes you? (according to level of education/respondent)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Participation in religious activities shows that young people have a considerable spiritual commitment to religious rituals and instructions. 37.7% regularly attend mosques and 20% pray frequently. Young people under the age of 25, particularly those with lower levels of education (primary and secondary: 24% of the sample), seem to be more religious than the other age groups.

Figure 6 Participation in religious activities



Social institutions play a crucial role in consolidating the religious culture of young people. The family is one of the main institutions influencing this culture. According to the results of the survey, its influence is estimated at 44%. School comes second, with 20% of respondents claiming to have been influenced by this institution during their school path. Religious institutions (mosques and religious schools) have a significant influence (13%), as does the Internet (13%) and the role of friends (10%). In addition to the family and the school, the type of environment, whether it is rural or urban, plays a significant part in determining the role of these social institutions as shown in figure no 8.

Figure 7 What is the influence of these institutions in your education or religion culture? (%)





Figure 8 Influence of institutions in education or religion culture according to type of settlement



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.


Economic deprivation

The survey sample is made up of 40% students. The unemployment rate among the young people surveyed was 19.7%. This rate is lower than in 2014. According to the 2014 census, the unemployment rate

for the 15-34 age group was estimated at 27.8%.[2] This may be explained by the large representation of middle class in the sample as more than half claimed to belong to the middle class.


11.9% of young people are employed full-time and 20.2% are working independently. For parents, the unemployment rate was reported to be 61.24% for mothers and 9.4% for fathers. 41% of fathers are freelance and 12.3% are employed in agriculture.

Figure 9 What is your current status and the status of your parents? (%)



Among young people in work, 30% say they are dissatisfied with their jobs. Dissatisfaction is highest among young people employed in insecure part-time jobs or in agriculture. 88% of those who are dissatisfied are looking for a job.

Figure 10 Are you satisfied with your job? (%)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

[2] National Institute of Statistics (NIS), 2017, General Census of Population and Housing - 2014, Economic characteristics of the population.

How do young people perceive their own and their parents' income class? According to the survey data, 55.5% belong to the middle class. The trend towards impoverishment outweighs the social mobility to the upper class as shown in the figure below.

Figure 11 What income class do you consider you and your parents belong to? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The economic situation of the household influences the living conditions of young people and their right of access to adequate housing that respects the gender and privacy of each member. This hypothesis can be verified for 77% of young people (males and females) who live with their parents, and who have their own rooms in shared accommodation (75% women and 77% men).

Figure 12 Who do you currenly live with? (according to gender)





Figure 13 Do you have your own room? (yes answer)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

This situation of wellbeing or of discomfort is described by the young people surveyed as follows:

- 76% of males and 83% of females live with their parents since it is the easiest solution for their families.
- 18% of males and 10% of females would live by themselves if they had financial self-reliance.
- 3.7% of males and females are confronted with the judgments of their parents, who cannot bear the idea of their children living alone.

Figure 14 Which of the following statements best describes your situation? (according to gender)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Territorial inequalities


Territorial inequalities have been identified in previous CONNEKT research reports as a significant factor in the combination of drivers of radicalisation in Tunisia (Chirchi and Ghribi, 2023) in neighbourhoods, and these inequalities can be identified in the way in which the state and local authorities provide services to residents. Perception of the quality-of-service provision defines feelings of security amongst young people as security should not be understood in a sense strictly linked to the "police" function, but extends across different components to cover access to services, facilities and networks (water, electricity, NICT, transportation, etc.), access to public spaces, fair waste collection, street lighting in neighbourhoods, etc. In a survey conducted in 2022 by the Jasmine Foundation on citizen's evaluation of municipal services, the satisfaction rates of young people vary, depending on the region, from 30% to 50%, while the lowest rates concern access to information and the improvement of urban public spaces.[3]

Young people's perception of safety varies according to their environment and territorial scale. The answers to the question "To what extent do you feel safe?" show that the perception of safety is strongly correlated with young people's sense of belonging to their local area. In neighbourhoods where neighbourhood relations play a key role in consolidating social ties, the perception of safety is positive (63.6% of young

[3] Jasmine Foundation, 2023, Rapid Monitoring and Social Assessment of municipal services (survey conducted on a sample of 5,500 observations and 11 Tunisian municipalities).

people feel safe in their neighbourhoods). This feeling declines as we move further away from the neighbourhood. In towns and cities, the rate of insecurity rises, whereas it stands at 31% when outside the area (the country, for example).


Figure 15 To what extent do you feel safe? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.


The perception of safety varies depending on whether young people live in urban or rural areas. From local to national level, young people feel more insecure when they live in urban areas. A comparison of the figures shows that these rates can triple when moving from rural to urban areas. The effect of the demographic size of settlements on perceptions of safety is remarkable. It is inversely proportional: as the size of urban areas increases, the feeling of safety decreases (Figure No 16).

Figure 16 Safety perception according to type of settlement



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.


Figure 17 Safety perception according to settlement size



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Perception by gender shows that males are more exposed to the risk of insecurity in their neighbourhoods or towns. The margin of indecision (neither safe nor unsafe) is often more than 50% for young men.

Figure 18 Safety perception according to gender



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Digital socialisation

Socialisation through digital technology is a major challenge for digital societies. The digital culture based on NICTs has a clear impact on the socialisation of young people. Widespread access to social networks


is reducing public spaces in favour of alternative virtual spaces. The survey published by the NIS in 2017[4] reports on young people's access to digital resources, in particular hardware (computer, tablet, smartphone, etc.), and to the Internet. According to the survey, 33.1% of households had computers. In rural areas, the figure was 9.8%. The usage rate was 46%. For mobile phones, 97% of households in both areas were equipped.

Regarding Internet access, the 2017 survey showed that Internet use was 45.6%, while it was only 28% in rural areas. The main findings of the study showed that the largest proportion of Internet users were teenagers and young people aged between 10 and 34, both boys and girls.

Our survey confirms the results of the 2017 survey. It shows that:

- 72.9% of young people have access to the Internet, 57% of whom are in urban areas.
- The rate of Internet access in rural areas is 15.9%. This result shows that there has been a clear development in young people's access to digital networks, compared with the 2017 national survey, which gave a figure of 58.8% of young people aged 15 to 34 who had access to the Internet.

Figure 19 Do you have internet access? (according to type of settlement)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.


An analysis of the time spent online shows that:

- 57% of young people spend more than 3 hours a day online.
- 40% of young people spend more than 4 hours online, both boys and girls.
- The young people who spend the most time on the Internet are those in the 20-24 age group, who account for 15.2% (more than 4 hours online). For the 20-29 age group, the rate is 27.5%.

These results increase the risks of exposure to VE contents and the discourse available online, which can get worse as time spent on the Internet increases. The most vulnerable young people are those in the 20-29 age group. This risk does not spare young people of younger ages (15-19), who are even more vulnerable, and 22% of whom spend more than an hour on the Internet.

[4] NIS, 2017, Housing, households and ICTs. Tunisia.


Figure 20 How many hours per day on average do you spend on the Internet? (according to age range)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The reasons for using the Internet tend to be related to communicating with friends and family (78%), accessing social networks (71.2%), and recreational use (watching television, listening to music, videogames). Access to information (39.2%) and work/school (35.8) seem secondary reasons for young people's daily use of the Internet, but still show important percentages.


Figure 21 For what purpose do you use the internet? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Although the means of protecting oneself are sometimes available through the use of VPNs, this network is not sufficiently used or well recognised by young people. Only 17.4% use VPN, while 67.8% do not know what it is.

Figure 22 Use of VPN (%)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

For young people who use VPNs, the main reason is protecting themselves or their virtual location which concerns 9.1% of those questioned. For the others, they are often looking for anonymity, independence, or trying to find refuge in prohibited or blocked sites.

It is obvious that this form of virtual socialisation risks increasing young people's exposure to radicalisation. Depending on how they are used, NICTs are public refuge areas for young people looking for special experiences. High-risk sites may present different forms of radical expression, leading young people to become involved in violent dynamics.

Figure 23 What was the reason for using VPN? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Political issues

In Tunisia, the right to political participation is guaranteed by the Organic law on elections.[5] The presidential, legislative, and municipal elections are the main occasions for assessing young people's involvement in public affairs through participation in elections.

[5] Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic (OJTR 14/2017), Organic law number 07 of 2017, amending and completing the Organic law number 16 of 2014 relating to elections and referendums.


The national survey on local governance[6] gives a clear idea of young people's participation in political and civil life (political parties, trade unions, associations, or sports clubs). According to this survey, 20.4% of young people aged 18 to 29 participate in political or civil activities. However, participation in political parties represents 19.3%

The results of our survey show that 39.6% of young people have never taken part in elections. 4.5% have taken part in all elections, and 15% have taken part in most elections. Cross-referencing with age groups leads us to consider the following results:


- The 30-34 age group is the most involved in political life. This age group participates in the majority of elections (42.5%).
- Young people aged 25-29 have a low level of participation as 45.5% said they took part in a limited number of elections while 23.3% have never taken part in an election.
- Only 12.8% of 20-24-year-olds took part in most elections, and 2% took part in all elections.
- Young people aged 15-19 showed a marked lack of interest in elections, reflecting their disengagement from political life.

Figure 24 How many times did you vote since you were granted the right to vote (%)

According to age range:



Total:




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

[6] NIS, 2017, National Survey on local Governance. Tunisia.

The relevance of young people's political involvement and their participation in public affairs can be measured by two parameters: trust in institutions and satisfaction with the delivery of public services.

Based on the responses to the question "How much trust do you have in the following institutions?", it is possible to draw up a ranking of institutions according to respondents' level of trust: political parties and the media are the most distrusted institutions (with a trust rate of 9% to 10%). Trust in local and regional authorities comes second with a rate of around 27%. In third place come the police (34%) and the judiciary (48%). However, young people express a higher level of trust in the army (76.4%), religious leaders (67.4%) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (64%).


Figure 25 How much trust do you have in the following institutions?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

85.3% of young people expressed dissatisfaction with public action in the employment sector. This feeling is shared by 76.2% of young people for health services, 77.7% for transport, and 70.8% for leisure services. Overall, the satisfaction rate for all public services was only 9%.


Figure 26 Rate your level of (dis)satisfaction with the country's public services?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

How do young people perceive foreign affairs and their influence on the country? 90.7% of the people surveyed confirm the influence of the European Union on national public policies. This was also the case for the USA (82.6% of the sample). According to the survey results, the weakest influences come from Iran, Russia and Libya.


Figure 27 Is there foreign influence in your country from? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

This may explain why the young people surveyed are cautious in their support for the government's foreign policies. In this respect, almost 51% support the government's policy towards Palestine and Algeria (40.5%). However, there was a high level of dissatisfaction with the government's policy towards France (55.5%), the EU (44.3), Italy (39%) and America (50.6). It should also be noted that the proportion of young people who are undecided (neutral) on this question is high (from 28% to 52.5%), which may reflect young people's disaffection with public affairs and politics as a whole.

Figure 28 Do toy agree with the foreign policy of your government regarding? (%)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Education, culture and leisure opportunities

Outside the family, young people build their own social networks from their experiences in school and civic life. Friendships are often decisive in developing young people's personalities and their attitudes to several issues including VE and radicalism. For 19% of the young people surveyed, it is difficult to judge the success or failure of their experiences of friendship, so they remain in the "neutral" zone. However, 81%

of the sample has already had an experience of friendship. 55% of them are satisfied with this relationship and 17% are very satisfied, giving a satisfaction rate of 72%.

If we relate these rates to the social environment of the young people, we can deduce that the feeling of satisfaction is greater in rural areas. Solidarity still plays a decisive role in maintaining neighbourhood relations and friendships, making social ties stronger in rural areas.

Figure 29 How satisfied/dissatisfied are your friends?






Figure 30 How satisfied/dissatisfied are your friends? (according to type of settlement)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The Internet seems to dominate the cultural and leisure activities of the young people surveyed. Public provision in terms of traditional cultural activities (youth centres, cultural centres, clubs, etc.) is currently being challenged, as it does not offer serious alternatives to the risks of exposing the most vulnerable young people to extremism. This is borne out by the survey results, which show that 76% of the sample chooses the Internet as their main leisure activity or hobby. On the other hand, 34.8% of young people do not read (books or magazines), 18% never play sport, 6.6% have no friendships, 5.6% do not listen to music, and 20.3% are not interested in the media or TV.

Figure 31 How often do you conduct each of these activities?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

By targeting the gender of the respondents and their living environment, urban or rural, other results were drawn:

- Social relations and networks based on friendship as a common space for socialisation and cultural exchange are more important for boys and in urban areas. For girls, 9.5% had never been with friends. In rural areas, this rate rises to 14.5% and concerns both girls and boys.
- Reading is no longer recognised by young people as a leisure activity, particularly among boys, 42% of whom have never done so. The rates remain very similar in urban and rural areas, at between 33% and 35%.
- Although rural areas are better suited to sporting activities, the rate of young people who have never taken part in sport is 22.4% (compared with 16.7% in urban areas). Girls were the most affected, with 25.3% saying they had never taken part in sport (10.7% for boys). This result, which could be interpreted as young people giving up on sporting activities, also reflects the lack of appropriate equipment and facilities, both in urban and rural areas and in neighbourhoods, dedicated to sporting activities. Poorly organised school time, combined with transport and travel problems, contribute to a reduction in free time, which in turn limits their chances of entertainment.

Figure 32 Young people how never conduct each of these activities (according to gender)





Figure 33 Young people how never conduct each of these activities (according to type of settlement)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The evaluation of young people's civil involvement in voluntary activities shows that 47% of those surveyed had taken part in volunteering work. The participation rate for girls (48%) is similar to that for boys (46%). However, participation in rural areas (35%) was lower than in urban areas (50%).

Figure 34 Have you ever been involved in any volunteering work?


Figure 35 Have you ever been involved in any volunteering work? (according to type of settlement)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

The types of volunteering work in which young people take part are conducted by associations and NGOs (59%). Voluntary action, often of a human and personal nature, concerned 36% of respondents who said that they had helped people with special needs and colleagues (24%). Other forms of voluntary participation include organising cultural events (31%) or sports events (23%) and taking part in community or religious activities (19%).

Figure 36 Type of volunteering (%)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

Transnational dynamics

The presence of the diaspora in Tunisia has increased since 2011, especially following the political instability in the Arab world (Libya and Syria more specifically). New migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa are settling in large cities and their informal neighbourhoods. With the rise in numbers of informal migrants from the South, the problem of diasporas is tending to become a geopolitical crisis that requires special attention from governments on both sides of the Mediterranean. Despite the diversity of the diaspora in Tunisia, the government has no reliable statistics on this phenomenon, which makes it difficult to put in place a specific policy in favour of these communities.

Today, migrants are indirectly involved in the formal and informal economic circuits, which offer them insecure jobs, particularly in the agricultural and construction sectors. It is noticeable that the political context of the crisis of sub-Saharan African migrants in Tunisia and the political discourse on it have influenced the young people understanding and responses on the question of the "diaspora". Rather than addressing the role of the Tunisian diaspora around the world and particularly in Europe, the young people understood the term "diaspora" to refer only to African sub-Saharan migrants. Following the political and media discourses and atmosphere at the time of the survey, young people perceived the presence of the diaspora as a nuisance as 15% of them consider that informal migrants are strongly connected to the resident population. Furthermore, 25% of respondents consider that the diaspora has a strong and extreme impact on the country's society and socioeconomic situation. For 14%, this impact affects the customs and religious life of the population.

Figure 37 How do you think diaspora




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

THE INFLUENCE OF EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM DRIVERS

This section aims to answer the question: "How exposure to violence has an impact on the perception of the drivers?", Exposure to violence was measured by assessing young people's perception of their involvement in violent acts or conflicts in different situations. The assessment of youth perceptions showed that the main scenes of physical violence they were exposed to took place in schools and universities (45.6% had taken part in violent physical conflicts in schools or at universities). For 36.7% of the young people surveyed, the neighbourhood can become a scene of physical violence. This behaviour also concerns young people whose friendship or partnership has turned into conflict (34.1%). Physical violence was directed at institutions representing public order and the state, in particular the police (25.2%), as well as public places of expression and entertainment, in particular clubs and coffee shops (23.4), and sports facilities (20.2%). What also emerges from this evaluation is that 20.4% of the young people surveyed had taken part in violent conflicts on the basis of different religious convictions, but even fewer for political reasons (7.4%).


Figure 38 Exposure to violence (Have you ever participated in physically violent conflict)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Physical violence affects both boys and girls. In the various situations proposed, girls are involved in violent conflicts, particularly at school, in neighbourhoods or with the police.


Figure 39 Have yo ever participated in physically violent conflict (according to gender)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

Cross-referencing this variable with the environment (rural/urban) provides more detailed findings on young people's exposure to violence. Conflicts at school or on the basis of diversity of religious beliefs accentuate violence among young people in rural areas. However, violent conflicts that emerge during political debates or in the context of entertainment are more significant in urban areas.

Figure 40 Have yo ever participated in physically violent conflict (according to type of settlement)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

The relationship between exposure to violence and the family environment of the young people surveyed reveals that:

- Young people living alone or with separated parents (especially those living with their fathers) are the most exposed to violent conflict, both in public spaces (neighbourhoods, cafés, clubs, with the police, etc.) and in schools and universities. This vulnerable group, which has difficulty maintaining friendly relationships, often enters into conflict with partners (75%).
- Living with friends or relatives does not reduce exposure to violence. The survey shows that more than 40% of young people who live outside the family contribute to violent physical conflicts.
- Young people living with a partner or spouse are the least exposed to violence.

Figure 41 Have yo ever participated in physically violent conflict (according to twhom the respondent currently lives with)



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.


Can the risk of exposure to violence be linked to Internet access? To answer this question, we tried to estimate the risk using the "Risk estimate" and "Odds ratio" estimators. This ratio was applied to all the items of the "exposure to violence" driver. The following estimates emerged from this analysis:

- The Chi-Square values (causal value of the relationship between the two variables) show a very weak relationship between Internet access and exposure to violence. This drive is independent of the digital communication tools and then varies according to the personal experience of young people in their family, school, university, and social environments. In fact, the latter values are relatively too high to establish causality between Internet access and exposure to violence in schools and with the police.
- In a scenario where the risks of exposure to violence are reduced, the "Odds ratio" value shows that the hypothesis that exposure to violence increases with changes in Internet access should be rejected. The estimated risk is less than 2%. It can be envisaged, in the long term, in a scenario of physical conflicts growth between young people and the police (1.6%).

Items: Participation in physically violent conflict: /Internet access	**Chi-Square Tests**	**Risk Estimate (Participation in physically violent conflict/Internet access)**		
		Odds Ratio Value	**95% Confidence Interval**	
			Lower	Upper
with other young people in the neighbourhood/ Internet access	0,8	,830	,556	1,240
with other young people in a club or in a café/ Internet access	1,6	,748	,477	1,173
in a sports hall, on a football pitch, etc. / Internet access	1,9	,722	,451	1,154
in school/at university/Internet access	4,9	,641	,432	,951
with young people of other religious convictions/ Internet access	2,6	,680	,425	1,088
young people of other political convictions/ Internet access	0,0	,969	,456	2,060
with the police (e.g., on protests)/ Internet access	3,8	1,619	,998	2,627
with a partner/Internet access	2,2	,737	,491	1,106

Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Figure 42 Risk Estimate (Odds Ratio Value)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

THE OPINION OF YOUNG PEOPLE ON PUBLIC POLICIES REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

What do young people think about preventing VE? The opinions shared by the young people surveyed put the emphasis on:

- Firstly, religious education, which 76.3% of respondents felt would help to contain extremism and reduce its negative impact. Only 14% considered that there were barriers to the free practice of religion, while 24.6% were neutral.
- Secondly, the importance of public policies in reducing the risk of VE, by implementing appropriate measures to ensure the equitable distribution of resources between citizens and regions. This opinion was shared by 66.6% of the young people surveyed.
- Lastly, monitoring social media is a major challenge in containing VE.

Figure 43 Do you agree with following statements?



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

According to the attitudes of young people, the factors driving radicalism are mostly religious (25.8%). Public policies which must then be challenged (21.4%), as if they are not conducted effectively, they lead to territorial inequalities and therefore accentuate the disparity between regions and social classes (as a 3rd order factor: 15.2%). Digital space does not appear to be as decisive a factor as the previous ones, as it is ranked at 4th level (14.4%). In last order, leisure, and transnational dynamics.

Figure 44 Rank of factors driving redicalisation





Figure 45 Factors driving redicalisation



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia

Young people's responses on how to prevent radicalism confirm their attitudes. Indeed, 32.4% believe that action should be taken through religious education. For 19%, the solution lies in economic policies and job opportunities. For a smaller group (14.4% of young people), preventing radicalism means giving people their political rights and encouraging the participation and representation of young people in public life. For 12.5%, it means working better on the fair distribution of services and wealth. As final solutions, young people cite the challenges of digitalisation (9.8%), cultural dialogue and recreational spaces.

Figure 46 Responses to prevent radicalisation





Figure 47 Responses to prevent radicalisation (Rink 1)




Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

LOCAL SPECIFICITIES

In this section, we attempt to translate the responses of the young people surveyed into priority actions, in relation to the size of the settlements covered by the survey. The aim is to guide decision-making (setting up a strategic action plan to prevent radicalism, for example) based on a participatory approach (in particular through this questionnaire). The priority actions are as follows:

- For small settlements with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, the priority and urgent action is to work on the religious education of young people.
- In towns of between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, action will focus on religious education, as well as on job creation and the equitable distribution of services and wealth.
- In medium-sized towns (50,000-100,000 inhabitants), the focus will continue to be on religious education, followed by the development of political rights and economic opportunities.
- In metropolises (largest cities), the intervention is more complex and concerns all actions, particularly economic and political initiatives.

Figure 48 Local intervention priorities: Settlements of 2,001-5,000 inhabitants



Source: Questionnaire employed for the micro-level survey on drivers of radicalisation and VE in Tunisia.

Figure 49 Local intervention priorities: Settlements of 20,001-50,000 inhabitants




Figure 50 Local intervention priorities: Settlements of 50,001-100,000 inhabitants





Figure 51 Local intervention priorities: Settlements of more 100,000 inhabitants





Conclusion

A study of the drivers led to the following conclusions:

Young people's religiosity is determined by their level of education. Indeed, 40% of those with a primary or secondary education develop a strong religious attachment. The under-25s, who are most affected by this attitude, have a considerable religious commitment. Participation in religious activities (regular attendance at mosques, frequent prayer) concerns more than 37% of the sample.

Family and school are the main social institutions in the prevention of radicalism, as they continue to play a crucial role in consolidating religious culture among young people. This role can be supported by other religious institutions (mainly the mosque) as well as the virtual environment (Internet, social networks, etc.), whose influence is estimated by the respondents at 13%.

The economic deprivation driver shows that more than half of the young people surveyed belong to the middle class, with a tendency towards impoverishment. Young people's dissatisfaction with their economic situation is caused by precarious working conditions (part-time, agriculture, no social protection). In the face of economic insecurity, the family is the guarantor of young people's social integration and their protection against violent radicalisation. Moreover, 80% of young people live with their parents since it is the easiest solution for the family. This dissatisfaction also affects young people's perception of public policies geared towards employment, and public services related to health, transport, administration and leisure.

Young people's perception of safety varies according to their environment and the area they live in. In neighbourhoods with strong social ties, the perception of safety is positive. This perception decreases as you move further away from the neighbourhood, opening to wider and more uncertain territories, particularly in towns and urban areas of larger cities.

Internet access is becoming increasingly easier in both urban and rural areas. However, the risk of exposure to this network remains high, affecting 57% of young people who connect for more than 3 hours a day. The Internet is currently the most accessible alternative for young people, given the destruction of traditional cultural institutions (youth centres, cultural centres, clubs, etc.) and the difficulty of accessing sports and leisure facilities. These figures reflect the extent to which young people are vulnerable, shutting themselves off from the public domain and issues, which can make them easy targets for extremist ideas as well as easy prey to manipulation and recruitment by VE digital social networks and contents.

Young people's participation in public life is insufficient, especially in the under-25 age group. This disengagement is due to a lack of trust in the institutions of political parties, the media, local and regional authorities, and the police. However, trust is well established with the institutions of the army, religious leaders, and NGOs. With the growth in the number of associations in Tunisia, the participation of young

people in associative activities is increasing (47% according to the survey). This sector, which mobilises a large number of young people in voluntary activities (59% of those surveyed), represents an important opportunity to prevent radicalisation. When it comes to implementing a communication strategy with young people, with the aim of mitigating VE, these actors can be reliable partners for communicating with the most vulnerable young people and conveying appropriate messages.

Exposure to violence, as expressed by young people's involvement in violent conflict, is a risk that is increasing in schools and universities, as well as in residential areas and public spaces. Conflicts arising from contradictory religious attitudes among young people is one of the reasons for the rise in violence in rural areas. In urban areas, however, the causes tend to be linked to political affinities or sports entertainment. This factor is closely linked to the living environment of young people, who either live in families or with separated parents. The survey showed that young people who live alone or with separated parents are the most exposed to violent conflict, both in public spaces (neighbourhoods, cafés, clubs, with the police, etc.) and in schools and universities. Although unsecured access to the Internet is a risk that could exacerbate exposure to sites that trivialise violence, it does not appear as a determining factor in exposure to violence. This risk can probably be considered, in the long term, in a scenario of the evolution of physical conflicts between young people and the police.

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CONNEKT

What drives youth to violent extremism? How can they turn from being "the problem" into "the key" for a solution? By engaging youth in the research, CONNEKT will raise young voices to become stakeholders in the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.

CONNEKT is a research and action project which analyses seven potential radicalisation factors among youth aged between 12 and 30: religion, digitalisation, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, socio-political demands, and educational, cultural and leisure opportunities and evaluates them on three levels: transnational/state, community and individual.

Its aim is to establish a multi-dimensional map of drivers of extremism among youth in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bulgaria, and to identify the interplay between them. Based on the empirical research findings, the project will end up recommending tools and measures for the prevention of violent extremism from a social and community perspective both for the regions of study and the European Union.

Under the coordination of the European Institute of the Mediterranean, (IEMed), the project gathers a multidisciplinary Consortium involving 14 partners from MENA, the EU and the Balkans.

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